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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial issues in collegiate sports today is 
whether student-athletes should be compensated for their play on the 
field.  This is a particularly hot topic in “big-time” college football and 
men’s basketball.1  Pay-for-play is a topic that is discussed on every sports 
radio show.  It is debated on SportsCenter and throughout blogs, 
comment boards, and newspapers around the country.2  The argument is 
 
1.  In this Comment, I will refer frequently to “big-time” college sports.  For purposes of 
this Comment, “big-time” college sports will be Division I college basketball and FBS college 
football. 
2.  See, e.g., Jay Bilas, College Athletes Should be Compensated, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (Mar. 14, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/13/ncaa-
and-the-interests-of-student-athletes/college-athletes-should-be-compensated [perma.cc/726F
-X9CH]; Pat Forde, Myth of Exploited, Impoverished Athletes, ESPN (July 18, 
2011), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6779583/college-athletes-far-exploited [http
s://perma.cc/N63J-EYPS]; Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, Why the Arguments Against NCAA 
Pay-For-Play Suck, DEADSPIN (Dec. 12, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://deadspin.com/why-the-
arguments-against-ncaa-pay-for-play-suck-1481854847 [https://perma.cc/ZF65-NHYX]; Marc 
Tracy & Ben Strauss, Victory for N.C.A.A. as Panel Strikes Down Pay for College Athletes, 
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that the idea of amateurism in these big-time college sports is outdated 
and nostalgic.3  And, considering the amount of money that is generated 
by these sports, it is almost impossible to disagree.4  Why then hasn’t the 
NCAA gotten with the times and removed its restrictions for 
compensating players for their performance on the field?  The answer is 
that the courts have consistently ruled that the preservation of 
amateurism is a procompetitive justification for such rules and restraints.5  
This means that such restraints are not a violation of antitrust law.6  As 
such, the NCAA has been able to continue such practices. 
However, the marketplace for these sports has dramatically shifted 
over the last thirty years, and such regulations should be a thing of the 
past.  Big-time college football and basketball are now multi-billion dollar 
industries, and to pretend that these student-athletes are amateurs is 
nonsense.7  Courts have been unwilling to rule against the NCAA, 
however, when it comes to player compensation.  That is until O’Bannon 
v. NCAA8 was released in 2014.9  In O’Bannon, the district court (and 
later the Ninth Circuit) put a chink in the armor that is the NCAA’s 
amateurism justification, and began to sway towards compensating 
players in these big-time sports.10  This ruling represents a major shift and 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/sports/obannon-ncaa-case-
court-of-appeals-ruling.html [perma.cc/FG5U-T9LP].   
3.  See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: 
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 8–9 (1995). 
4.  “The NCAA had total revenue of nearly $1 billion during its 2014 fiscal year.”  Steve 
Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-2014-1-billi
on-revenue/70161386/ [https://perma.cc/Z3AX-TEGA]. 
5.  See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093–94 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. 
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343–45 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 748 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990). 
6.  See, e.g., Banks, 977 F.2d at 1093–94; McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Gaines, 746 F. 
Supp. at 748. 
7.  Berkowitz, supra note 4; Revenue, NCCA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue [http://perma.cc/UK89-WCGR] (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015); Cork Gaines, College Football Reaches Records $3.4 Billion in Revenue, 
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.businessinder.com/college-football-
revenue-2014-12 [https://perma.cc/33FLA-9WWN]. 
8.  7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
9.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed in part and reversed in part this opinion.  
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).  Although it was reversed in part, it does 
not alter, or affect, my opinion in this Comment.   
10.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
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could be the beginning of the end for amateurism as a justification for the 
anticompetitive NCAA rules prohibiting player compensation. 
II. AMATEURISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ANTITRUST LAW 
A. History of Amateurism in the NCAA 
Since its inception in 1906, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) has provided an organized universe of 
intercollegiate athletic competition.11  It was founded by sixty-two 
university presidents for the purpose of setting uniform rules and 
regulations for intercollegiate football games.12  Today, it has roughly 
1,100 member institutions, each with expansive athletic departments that 
support a wide variety of men’s and women’s athletics.13  From its 
beginnings to the present, the goal has always been to provide a place 
where amateur student-athletes can compete while they receive a college 
education.14  Because of this, many of the rules and regulations have 
focused on the fact that these athletes are students.15  In the eyes of the 
association, they are amateurs.16  Not professionals.17  As such, one of the 
major rules from the beginning is that student-athletes are not to be 
compensated for their athletic performance. 
However, these amateurism rules have been anything but consistent 
throughout the last century.18  The initial 1906 bylaws of the NCAA state: 
No student shall represent a College or University in an 
intercollegiate game or contest who is paid or receives, directly or 
indirectly, any money, or financial concession, or emolument as 
past or present compensation for, or as prior consideration or 
inducement to play in, or enter any athletic contest, whether the 
said remuneration be received from, or paid by, or at the instance 
 
11.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 37, 39; Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism 
Has Evolved Over Time, NCAA NEWS ARCHIVE (Jan. 3, 2000, 4:07 PM), 
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2000/association-wide/debate+on+amateurism+h
as+evolved+over+time+-+1-3-00.html [https://perma.cc/SZR2-UA9B]. 
12.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963. 
13.  Id.; see also Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-histor
y-multidivision-classification [https://perma.cc/LK2C-8GTT] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). 
14.  See Hawes, supra note 11. 
15.  DIV. I MANUAL art. 2.9 (NCAA 2014); BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 69. 
16.  DIV. I MANUAL at art. 2.9 (NCAA 2014). 
17.  Id. at art. 1.3.1. 
18.  See Hawes, supra note 11. 
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of any organization, committee or faculty of such College or 
University, or any individual whatever.19 
This rule did not allow student-athletes to receive what are known in 
today’s college universe as athletic scholarships.20  In 1916, a new rule was 
enacted that defined an amateur as “one who participates in competitive 
physical sports only for pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and 
social benefits directly derived therefrom.”21  In 1922, it was added that 
an amateur is someone “to whom sport is nothing more than an 
avocation.”22  
Throughout these initial years, however, these rules were consistently 
ignored.23  For this reason the NCAA created its first enforcement 
committee in 1952 to monitor its member institutions.24  Finally, in 1956 
the NCAA created its first rule allowing what are now called “grant-in-
aid” scholarships to be awarded to student-athletes.25  These scholarships 
allow schools to award scholarships that pay for commonly accepted 
expenses associated with receiving a college education.26  These include 
tuition, fees, room and board, books, and incidental expenses.27  This is in 
contrast to what is known as “cost of attendance,” which is significantly 
higher.28   
 
19.  PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES app. at art. VII, § 3 (1907) [hereinafter 
SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION]. 
20.  See Hawes, supra note 11. 
21.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 28, 
1916 app. II at art. VI, § b.(2) (1917)). 
22.  Id. (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 29, 1921 app. I at art. VII, § 1 
(1922)). 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id.; 1955–1956 YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION NCAA app. at 5 (1956) [hereinafter 1955–1956 YEARBOOK OF THE NCAA]; 
Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures: The One-Year Rule 
and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Society, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 203, 219–
20 (2012). 
26.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974; 1955–1956 YEARBOOK OF THE NCAA, supra note 
25, art. III, § 1 O.I.1; Gibson, supra note 25, at 209 & n.31. 
27.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974. 
28.  Id. at 971.  Cost of attendance is an amount released by each school (using federal 
regulations) which states an estimate of how much it would cost to attend that school, including 
all living expenses.  Id.; DIV. I MANUAL at art. 15.02.2 (NCAA 2014). 
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The allowance that was given for these scholarships continued to 
change throughout the next few decades.  For example, in 1975 incidental 
expenses were removed as part of the “grant-in-aid” scholarships.29  In 
2004, students could receive a Federal Pell Grant (currently valued at 
$5,775) in addition to their “grant-in-aid.”30  The rules were again 
amended in 2013 to permit different levels of compensation in different 
sports.31  The NCAA constitution currently reads,  
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education 
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics in an avocation, 
and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.32 
Much of this change has been spurred on by the exponential change 
in the market demand for intercollegiate athletics.33  As the marketplace 
began to evolve, so did the NCAA’s rules for its compensation of 
“amateur” student-athletes.34  What was once an event between two 
schools has become one of the most lucrative and popular sporting 
competitions in the United States, especially when it comes to FBS35 
football and Men’s Division I basketball.  Such a rise in popularity has 
also given rise to antitrust litigation against the NCAA and its regulations 
based on protecting amateurism.36 
B. History of Antitrust Litigation Against the NCAA 
To begin, we will look at Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the cases 
that defined the Rule of Reason, which ultimately has been applied to the 
NCAA.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, 
 
29.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971. 
30.  Id. at 974; Federal Pell Grants, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/grants-scholarships/pell [https://perma.cc/E8H2-RPK3] (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
31.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974.  
32.  DIV. I MANUAL at art. 2.9 (NCAA 2014). 
33.  See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000; Berkowitz, supra note 4. 
34.  Compare DIV. I MANUAL at art. 2.9 (NCAA 2014), with SECOND ANNUAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 19, at app. at art. VII, § 3. 
35.  FBS stands for Football Bowl Subdivision. 
36.  See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 280 (summarizing decision by the 
Supreme Court discussing NCAA’s efforts to maintain amateurism and finding an anti-trust 
violation by the NCAA in limiting output of televised games). 
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combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal.”37  Early on, the courts found that certain 
practices, such as price fixing, were so pervasive that they were deemed 
per se illegal as a matter of law.38  Cases such as United States v. Socony-
Vaccum Oil Co. stated that horizontal price fixing agreements were so 
dangerous that market power doesn’t even have to be proven to prove a 
Section 1 violation.39   
However, the courts also recognized that certain practices could 
possibly be validated for their procompetitive benefits to the 
marketplace.40  In these circumstances, some horizontal agreements41 are 
not declared to be Section 1 violations.42  In these cases, the court will 
apply the Rule of Reason test.43  This test is designed to determine 
whether the procompetitive benefits of an agreement in restraint of trade 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the restraint on the market.44 
In a Rule of Reason case, the plaintiff must prove that the agreement 
placed an actual adverse effect on price or quantity in comparison to an 
unrestrained market, or infer market power by market analysis.45  If the 
plaintiff can prove either, then the defendant must prove the restraint has 
procompetitive benefits or justifications.46  If this is proven, the burden 
shifts again to the plaintiff to prove that the restraint is not necessary to 
achieve the procompetitive benefits, or that they could be achieved in a 
substantially less restrictive manner.47  Then, the court will weigh the 
benefits and anticompetitive effects of the restraint to determine if the 
 
37.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
38.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 211, 218 (1940). 
39.  Id. at 221. 
40.  See Nat’l. Soc’y. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686–87 (1978). 
41.  See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984).  “A 
restraint of trade imposed by agreement between competitors at the same level of distribution.  
The restraint is horizontal not because it has horizontal effects, but because it is the product of 
a horizontal agreement. — Also termed horizontal agreement; horizontal arrangement.”  
Horizontal Restraint, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
42.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01. 
43.  Id. at 100–04. 
44.  Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of 
NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 336 (2005). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id.; see also Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that the plaintiff could satisfy the last burden by showing that the procompetitive 
benefits could be achieved through less restrictive means). 
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practice is a violation of Section 1.48  In cases that apply the Rule of 
Reason, the court must look to the facts of the case.49  This requires an 
extensive inquiry for the plaintiff to prove an actual economic effect on 
the market, and for the defendant to prove the procompetitive benefits 
the restraint has in the market.50 
Throughout the early history of the NCAA, courts refused to apply 
antitrust law to the NCAA.51  The first time the NCAA faced serious 
opposition for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act was in NCAA v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.52  This is a seminal case 
in antitrust law because (1) it applied the Rule of Reason to NCAA 
regulations, declaring that it was a “unique[]” product that required 
certain agreements for the product to be available;53 and (2) it validated 
the NCAA’s assertion that the preservation of amateurism may be a valid 
procompetitive justification for its restraints in output markets54—an 
assertion that future courts used to create an almost per se legality for the 
NCAA’s amateurism and compensation rules.55   
In Board of Regents, members of the College Football Association 
(CFA)—led by the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia—challenged 
the television broadcasting plan that the NCAA was imposing on all 
member schools.56  The broadcasting plan limited the output of games 
broadcast each week and fixed the prices that could be charged for the 
broadcasting rights to that game.57  This particularly favored smaller 
schools since their games were televised at the same price as the bigger 
games, which tended to draw a bigger audience.58  The Court stated that 
 
48.  Nagy, supra note 44, at 336; see also Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 56 (noting the shifting 
burdens of proof in the Rule of Reason test). 
49.  See Nagy, supra note 44, at 338. 
50.  See id. (explaining that the factual inquiry includes conditions before and after the 
restraint was imposed, the history of the restraint, the end sought to be attained, the nature of 
the restraint, among others). 
51.  See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (ruling that collegiate 
athletes are students and not businessmen, making the NCAA not subject to the Sherman Act). 
52.  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
53.  Id. at 111–12, 115 n.55. 
54.  Id. at 101 n.23; Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of 
“Big Time” College Athletics: The Need to Shift From Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of 
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2000). 
55.  See infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text. 
56.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88, 94–95. 
57.  Id. at 91–94. 
58.  Id. at 92–93 (“[T]he amount that any team receives does not change with the size of 
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this practice of horizontal price fixing and output limitation was usually 
considered illegal per se.59  However the Court found that applying per se 
illegality to the NCAA was inappropriate because “horizontal restraints 
on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.”60  
Thus, the Court ruled that the Rule of Reason should be applied to the 
NCAA in antitrust litigation.61 
After applying the Rule of Reason, the Court ruled that the NCAA’s 
broadcasting plan violated the Sherman Act.62  This decision was made 
despite the Court’s “respect for the NCAA’s historic role in the 
preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics.”63  
This respect for the preservation of the tradition of amateur athletics was 
not enough for the NCAA to overcome the fact that it did not present 
enough evidence to prove that such a rule was commercially justifiable.64  
This ruling should have been important because the court declared 
that amateurism was not a legitimate justification for the anticompetitive 
restraints by the NCAA.65  However, what made it famous is the dicta in 
the opinion that gives respect to the NCAA’s objective of preserving 
amateurism.66  In particular, the Court stated that “[i]n order to preserve 
the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid . . . .”67  
This dicta should not have been binding on the Court.68  What should 
have been binding is that these amateurism rules merited full Rule of 
Reason analysis, and that amateurism is not always a legitimate 
 
the viewing audience, the number of markets in which the game is telecast, or the particular 
characteristic of the game or the participating teams. . . . [T]he ‘ground rules’ provide that 
carrying networks . . . submit a bid at an essentially fixed price.”).  This meant that games such 
as San Jose St. v. Fresno St. were given the same price as Ohio St. v. Michigan or USC v. Notre 
Dame.  See id.  And these prices were fixed so that schools weren’t allowed to individually 
negotiate the price for their own broadcasting rights.  Id. at 93 n.11. 
59.  Id. at 100. 
60.  Id. at 100–01, 101.  
61.  See id. at 103. 
62.  Id. at 120. 
63.  Id. at 100–01. 
64.  Id. 
65.  See Nagy, supra note 44, at 339–42 (explaining that this decision should have been a 
seminal case in showing that the NCAA’s amateurism justifications were not enough to 
overcome the burden of proving the procompetitive benefits to the marketplace). 
66.  Id. at 341–42. 
67.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). 
68.  The Ninth Circuit reinforced the fact that this dicta is not, nor should it be, binding 
on courts to “conclude that every NCAA rule that somehow relates to amateurism is 
automatically valid.”  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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justification for the restraints.  However, it resulted in a myriad of 
antitrust litigation in which the courts assumed that amateurism was a 
valid justification for the NCAA’s anticompetitive regulations on student 
compensation.69  This pattern of bowing to the dicta in Board of Regents 
made the NCAA’s amateurism rules basically per se legal.70 
This per se legality of the amateurism justification has made it so the 
NCAA would rarely lose a Section 1 case when the statute is applied to 
student eligibility and compensation rules.71  This is true even when the 
court of public opinion began to turn on the NCAA and its treatment of 
student-athletes as amateurs over the next few decades.72  Federal courts 
were firm and steadfast in their stance that the preservation of 
amateurism was a valid procompetitive justification for the NCAA’s 
cartel.  That is until O’Bannon entered the game.  
C. O’Bannon v. NCAA 
O’Bannon v. NCAA began a new trend73 that could be the beginning 
of the end of the court’s defense of the NCAA’s “preservation of 
amateurism” argument as a procompetitive justification for its 
anticompetitive restraints—at least as it pertains to restraints on student-
athlete compensation.74  In 2009, Ed O’Bannon—a former UCLA 
 
69.  See, e.g., Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines v. NCAA, 
746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
70.  See Chad Pekron, The Professional Student Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an 
Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 53 (2000) 
(“Whenever a court of law has discussed amateurism, the court has always simply assumed that 
it is necessary to produce college athletics.  However, the NCAA has never been required to 
prove that without amateurism, college athletics would be indistinguishable from professional 
athletics.”).  Some of the judges in these cases did realize that courts were not applying the 
Rule of Reason as Board of Regents directed, but they were the minority.  See, e.g., Banks, 977 
F. Supp. at 1088–89; id. at 1096 (Flaum, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that 
the court needed to apply the Rule of Reason because Banks clearly showed that there was “an 
anti-competitive effect in a relevant market”). 
71.  Mitten, supra note 54, at 5. 
72.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1000–01 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (stating that a 
survey used in the case suggests that public attitudes regarding compensation for student-
athletics depends on the level of compensation that the student-athletes would receive).   
73.  I call it a new precedent because the court in O’Bannon did not assume that the 
NCAA’s amateurism justification was per se legal as previous courts had.  However, it may be 
better to say that O’Bannon just brought anew the ruling from Board of Regents that 
amateurism alone is not enough to overcome anticompetitive restraints.  This assertion was 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049. 
74.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973–74.  This decision has since been affirmed in part and 
reversed in part by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049. 
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basketball player—along with many other current and former student-
athletes brought a class action suit against the NCAA claiming that the 
NCAA rules that restrict compensation of players for use of their name, 
likeness, and image violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.75  The rules 
prohibit any student-athlete from receiving “financial aid based on 
athletics ability” that exceeds a full “grant-in-aid.”76  Additionally, the 
NCAA prohibits any student-athlete from receiving financial aid in 
excess of the “cost of attendance” for that school.77  These rules also 
prohibit any student-athlete from receiving any compensation for his or 
her athletic skill from outside sources such as endorsements, gifts, or 
benefits.78  In short, the student-athlete may not receive “any 
remuneration for value or utility that the student-athlete may have for the 
employer because of the publicity, reputation, fame or personal following 
that he or she has obtained because of athletics ability.”79  This includes 
any compensation for licenses that the NCAA sells for the use of the 
student-athlete’s name, likeness, or image.80 
Like in Board of Regents, the NCAA argued that the preservation of 
amateurism was a procompetitive justification for the challenged 
restriction.81  The NCAA relied on the historical data, surveys, and 
witness testimony to provide sufficient evidence to prove this assertion.82  
Part of that argument was that amateurism is one of its “core principles” 
and has been since the inception of the association.83  However, unlike 
the court in Board of Regents, the court in O’Bannon ruled that this 
evidence was not “sufficient to justify the challenged restraint.”84  The 
court looked at the historical data and found that the NCAA’s 
inconsistent definition of amateurism significantly weakened its 
argument.85  It gibed at this evolution of amateurism in the NCAA and 
 
75.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962–63, 980–81. 
76.  Id. at 971. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 972. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. at 971. 
81.  Id. at 973; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 97 (1984). 
82.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973–982. 
83.  See id. at 1000 (explaining why the NCAA’s argument that it has traditionally been 
committed to amateurism is unpersuasive). 
84.  Id. at 973. 
85.  Id. at 1000. 
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declared that “[s]uch inconsistences are not indicative of ‘core 
principles.’”86   
The court also found that survey data provided by the NCAA was not 
“credible evidence that demand for the NCAA’s product would decrease 
if student-athletes were permitted . . . to receive a limited share of the 
revenue generated from the use of [the student-athlete’s] names, images, 
and likenesses.”87  However, later in the opinion, the court did suggest 
that the survey did provide at least some evidence that the consumer 
demand might be diminished if student-athletes were ever heavily 
compensated for their athletic abilities.88 
The most devastating blow to the future of amateurism in the NCAA 
was the opinion of the court as to the decision in Board of Regents.  To 
the chagrin of the NCAA, O’Bannon seems to significantly dilute the 
strength of the dicta in Board of Regents.89  The NCAA has consistently 
relied on Board of Regents in its defense of its amateurism justification in 
antitrust litigation.90  The district court in O’Bannon distinguished the 
case from Board of Regents because they dealt with two different 
markets.91  It declared that the amateurism justification in Board of 
Regents “does not stand for the sweeping proposition that student-
athletes must be barred, both during their college years and forever 
thereafter, from receiving any monetary compensation for the 
commercial use of their names, images, and likenesses.”92  It went even 
further by stating that the “suggestion” in Board of Regents that student-
athletes “must not be paid” so as to preserve the NCAA’s product “was 
 
86.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit weakened the NCAA’s argument by stating that “[e]ven if the 
NCAA’s concept of amateurism had been perfectly coherent and consistent . . . . [t]he NCAA 
cannot fully answer the court’s finding that the compensation rules have significant 
anticompetitive effects simply by pointing out that it has adhered to those rules for a long time.”  
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). 
87.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 976. 
88.  See id. at 1001 (concluding that student-athlete compensation plays a limited role in 
consumer demand for collegiate sports and that it may justify restrictions on large payments to 
student-athletes but does not justify a strict prohibition). 
89.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063 (stating that “Board of Regents . . . did not approve the 
NCAA’s amateurism rules as categorically consistent with the Sherman Act” and “we are not 
bound by Board of Regents to conclude that every NCAA rule that somehow relates to 
amateurism is automatically valid”); O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1003. 
90.  See Mitten, supra note 54, at 3–4 (stating that courts have frequently rejected anti-
trust challenges to NCAA regulations). 
91.  See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (explaining that Board of Regents addressed 
television broadcasting limits while O’Bannon is about compensating student-athletes). 
92.  Id. 
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not based on any factual findings in the trial record and did not serve to 
resolve any disputed issues of law.”93 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently has affirmed this opinion of the dicta 
in Board of Regents.94  In this appellate opinion, the court refused to 
acknowledge the view that, in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court 
“blessed” and exempted amateurism rules from antitrust scrutiny.95  The 
Ninth Circuit stated that it would use such language as “informative”96 
but that “a restraint that serves a procompetitive purpose can still be 
invalid under the Rule of Reason if a substantially less restrictive rule 
would further the same objectives equally as well.”97 
Such a denunciation of a seminal case furthers the proposition that 
“pure” amateurism is dying in the world of college sports.  The NCAA 
has consistently relied on Board of Regents to show that the preservation 
of amateurism is a strong procompetitive justification for any of its 
regulations in restraint of trade.98  This justification is hanging by a thread.   
However, it must be noted that this opinion did not kill the 
amateurism justification.  The district court did rule that the regulations 
play a “limited role in driving consumer demand” for college football and 
basketball.99  It held that a less restrictive alternative could achieve the 
same result for the NCAA in the marketplace.100  Therefore, in its 
remedy, the district court declared that student-athletes could be paid up 
to the “cost of attendance;” the NCAA could enact rules that give all 
student-athletes of the same class an equal share of licensing revenue; and 
the NCAA could to place a cap on compensation for licensing revenue at 
$5,000.101  This means that student-athlete compensation can basically be 
capped at cost of attendance plus the extra $5,000.   
 
93.  Id. 
94.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061–64. 
95.  Id. at 1064 (“We doubt that was the Court’s intent, and we will not give such an 
aggressive construction to its words.”). 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at 1064.  The Ninth Circuit then cites to language in Board of Regents to prove its 
point that “it is nevertheless well settled that good motives will not validate an otherwise 
anticompetitive practice.”  Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, at 101 n.23 (1984) (emphasis added). 
98.  See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conf., 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996); McCormack v. NCAA 
845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988). 
99.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1001 (N.D. Cal 2014). 
100.  Id. at 1004–07. 
101.  Id. at 1007–08.  These payments were expected to take effect August 1, 2015, when 
schools would begin offering scholarships to players that would enroll by July 1, 2016.  Steve 
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This is the point where the District Court and the Ninth Circuit 
differed in opinion.102  The Ninth Circuit affirmed that raising the grant-
in-aid cap for scholarships to be full cost of attendance was an acceptable 
less restrictive alternative, but it found that the district court “clearly 
erred when it found that allowing students to be paid compensation for 
their [name, image, and likeness licenses] is virtually as effective as the 
NCAA’s current amateur-status rule.”103 
However, this part of the opinion seems to be counterintuitive to the 
scope of review the Ninth Circuit has in this case.104  The Ninth Circuit 
claims that the evidence the district court relied on to make its 
determination about the cash compensation was insufficient.  But, in the 
same breath, it leans on its own opinions in making its determination, 
rather than relying solely on the evidence in the record.105  Further, where 
the majority does look at the evidence on the record, it looks at each piece 
of evidence separately as not being enough evidence, rather than showing 
that the evidence is insufficient as a whole.106  There were multiple expert 
testimonies and a survey that the district court accepted as evidence in 
making its determination about the cash compensation, which it was 
within its right to do.107  Yet, the Ninth Circuit decided to overrule the 
district court because it felt that evidence in the district court’s full bench 
trial was “meager.”108 
 
Berkowitz, NCAA Files for Stay of Injunction in O’Bannon Case, USA TODAY (July 18, 2015, 
10:43 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/07/17/ncaa-ed-obannon-name-
and-likeness-9th-circuit/30300441/ [https://perma.cc/YR4Y-WXNV].   
102.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076–79. 
103.  Id. at 1074. 
104.  The Ninth Circuit has de novo review for conclusions of law, but only a “clear error” 
review of the district court’s findings of fact.  Id. at 1061.  
105.  The court states that “the Olympics are not fit analogues to college sports” and that 
“[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and 
offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is . . . a quantum leap.”  Id. at 
1077–78.  These seem to be the court’s de novo review rather than a “clear error” review of the 
facts.  The dissent points that out by stating that the district court was well within its right to 
find that “the evidence presented at trial suggests that consumer demand for FBS football and 
Division I basketball-related products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation . . . .”  Id. at 1082 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
106.  See id. at 1076–79. 
107.  Id.; see also id. at 1082 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
108.  Id. at 1079.  There is definitely an argument to be made that the evidence would be 
preferred.  But is that enough to prove that the evidence was insufficient when a full bench trial 
determined that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s “quantum leap” statement, “offering them a 
small amount of compensation is so minor that it most likely will not impact consumer demand 
in any meaningful way”?  Id. at 1078 n.23; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 976–
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Although this holding included a minor victory for the NCAA,109 it 
seems that the tables have turned when it comes to amateurism as a 
procompetitive justification for its rules and regulations in restraint of 
trade.110  Unless something changes in the near future, it is likely that 
O’Bannon will become a banner case for student-athletes bringing 
Section 1 claims against the NCAA, just as Board of Regents was for the 
NCAA for the past thirty years.  And it is about time.  The economic 
realities of FBS Football and Men’s Basketball in the twenty-first century 
are such that there is no longer a viable reason to treat these players as 
though they are amateurs.111  They are not.  And O’Bannon takes the first 
step towards this new paradigm in college athletics. 
III. APPLYING THE FACTS OF TODAY’S COLLEGE ATHLETICS TO 
ANTITRUST LAW 
As discussed above, there must be an extensive factual inquiry into 
the situation of the market when a court is presented with an antitrust 
lawsuit.112  The plaintiffs must show evidence demonstrating the 
anticompetitive effects of agreements, and defendants must offer 
evidence that demonstrates actual procompetitive effects.113  The court 
must make its decision based on these facts offered by the parties in the 
case.114  In a “classic statement of the [R]ule of [R]eason,”115 the Supreme 
Court ruled: 
To determine [the legality of the restraint] the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, 
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This is not because a 
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or 
 
77, 983–84, 1000–01 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  I think not. 
109.  The Ninth Circuit opinion is a small victory in that it gave minimal validity to its 
argument that its amateur status for student-athletes is a part of its product, and to remove it 
would negatively impact the market. 
110.  See supra notes 50, 65–74 and accompanying text. 
111.  See infra Part III. 
112.  See supra p. 516 and notes 49–50. 
113.  This means that defendants must show that the agreement actually “enhance[s] 
competition.”  See Nagy, supra note 44, at 336. 
114.  See supra pp. 516–17. 
115.  Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 n.13 (1982). 
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the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to 
interpret facts and to predict consequences.116 
Until O’Bannon, courts did not follow this precedent and continually 
refused to follow the lead of the court in Board of Regents and apply a 
full Rule of Reason inquiry.117  This pattern of either overlooking the facts 
or refusing to make a factual inquiry can be described as the “blind look’ 
Rule of Reason.”118  Rather than applying the facts of the case to the 
regulation, they have turned a blind eye to any amateurism regulation.  
This section of this Comment makes such a factual inquiry into the 
business of college football and men’s basketball.  The conclusion is that 
the economic realities of these big-time college athletics are such that it 
is no longer a procompetitive justification for the amateurism regulations 
of the NCAA.119  Future courts should take a closer look at these 
economic realities when they make decisions regarding the amateurism 
and compensation rules in the NCAA.120  This factual inquiry will show 
ample evidence that (1) there is a market for player compensation, (2) the 
purposes the NCAA purports for its amateurism rules are no longer a 
part of today’s big-time college athletics marketplace, and (3) there is no 
procompetitive economic evidence for restricting this market. 
A. “Student-Athletes” v. Professionals 
In defending its amateurism regulations, the NCAA has consistently 
maintained that student-athletes are just that—students.121  The 
association purports that one of its main goals is the education of its 
student-athletes and that athletics are just a way to gain such an 
education.122  While the fact that education is important to the association 
 
116.  Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (emphasis added). 
117.  See supra pp. 512, 516. 
118.  Nagy, supra note 44, at 34243, 358 (discussing how the courts did not follow 
precedent and that their treatment of these anticompetitive regulations was sociologically 
rather than legally based). 
119.  That is if it ever was a viable procompetitive justification for such rules.  If the court 
had followed the ruling in Board of Regents, then it is possible that this issue would have been 
resolved decades ago.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). 
120.  See infra Part III.D. 
121.  Money & March Madness: Interview Mark Emmert, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-march-madness/interviews/mark-emmer
t.html [https://perma.cc/8TBU-KAR9] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) (quoting the President of the 
NCAA) (“[T]hese young men and women are students; they’ve come to our institutions to gain 
an education and to develop their skills as an athlete . . . .”). 
122.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 974–75 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Mitten, supra note 
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may be true,123 neither the institution nor the athletes view them as 
primarily students.124  What is more true is to say that “universities 
sponsoring ‘big-time’ football and basketball programs effectively serve 
as a farm system for the National Football League and National 
Basketball Association by providing the training environment and 
playing field for talented football and basketball players to hone their 
physical talents.”125 
This section is not concluding that the NCAA should not regulate 
academic standards for its athletes.  On the contrary, these athletes are 
all attending academic institutions and such academic standards are 
expected by all students attending that institution.  What this section is 
concluding is that their status as students at the school does not 
automatically mean that they are amateurs.  On the contrary, many 
students at universities are already paid professionals, or semi-
professionals, in a field that they are studying.126  The status of these 
athletes as “students” does not automatically mean they are amateurs.127 
In fact, they most certainly are not, and the facts surrounding big-time 
college football and basketball support this theory.  As such, under the 
Rule of Reason, the facts presented in this section are evidence against 
the NCAA’s claim that its amateurism rules are meant to promote an 
athlete’s status as student first, and athlete second. 
For decades, universities have used athletes as tools to help boost 
their perception as an exceptional institution in the eyes of the public and 
their peers.128  They do this by admitting poorly-prepared students—who 
 
54, at 1. 
123.  These institutions are, after all, schools. 
124.  See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at ch. 16 (discussing the mutual 
exploitation between athletes and academic institutions). 
125.  Mitten, supra note 54, at 2. 
126.  For example, many teachers have assistants that are students who are paid 
compensation for their time and work with professors and students on campus.  Dance students 
on some campuses are paid to teach dance classes either at the university or at competitive 
studios.  Business students can simultaneously be entrepreneurs, creating and receiving profits 
from their own businesses. 
127.  This is contrary to Judge Tauro’s opinion in Jones v. NCAA, in which he viewed 
Jones only as a “student” and “not a businessman.”  Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. 
Mass. 1975). 
128.  See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 45.  Ray T. Ellickson, NCAA faculty 
representative at the University of Oregon in 1966 was quoted as saying, “I am convinced that 
if a state institution wants equal treatment with another institution in that state, it must present 
an image of equal stature and, perhaps unfortunately, that image is most easily present in 
athletics.”  Id. 
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are simultaneously highly-recruited high school athletes—and give them 
the lowest quality course work so that the athlete can maintain minimum 
eligibility standards.129  Walter Byers, former Executive Director of the 
NCAA, once recognized that “college presidents have an inherent urge 
to engage in public relations exercises.  In one speech they ‘view with 
alarm’ the athletics orgy while in another speech ‘point with pride’ 
at . . . their own campuses.”130 
One of the more prominent examples of this is the story of Kevin 
Ross, a basketball player at Creighton University.  Upon completing his 
four years of eligibility,131 it became public knowledge that Ross had only 
a second-grade reading level.132  In 1989, after years of trying to figure out 
life after basketball, which included alcohol and drug issues, he sued 
Creighton, claiming it should have known about his illiteracy and that it 
failed to teach him adequately.133  His situation became a national story, 
and Ross was the talking point of many national articles and talk shows.134 
Unfortunately, the story of Kevin Ross is not a singularity.  This 
practice of admitting illiterate athletes into higher-education institutions 
purely for their athletic ability is still very much alive.135  A CNN 
investigation in early 2013 revealed that most schools still have 7–18% of 
their “revenue sport athletes who are reading at an elementary school 
level.”136  This is a fact that the NCAA continues to ignore, which seems 
 
129.  Id. at 299. 
130.  Id. at 47. 
131.  DIV. I MANUAL at art. 12.8 (NCAA 2014) (“A student-athlete shall not engage in 
more than four seasons of intercollegiate competition in any one sport.”).  This must be 
completed within five years from the first semester that the student began attending the 
institution full-time.  Id. at art. 12.8.1. 
132.  Jack Curry, Suing for 2d Chance to Start Over, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1990, at B9, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/30/sports/suing-for-2d-chance-to-start-over.html?pagewante
d=1 [https://perma.cc/56D3-K55E]. 
133.  Id.; BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 299. 
134.  See Curry, supra note 131; see also BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 299 
(discussing the recognition of Ross’ story); Outside the Lines: Unable to Read, ESPN (Mar. 17, 
2002), http://sports.espn.go.com/page2/tvlistings/show103transcript.html [https://perma.cc/4K2
5-4K8W] (showing the transcript of an episode of Outside the Lines in which Ross discusses his 
struggles at Creighton). 
135.  See Sara Ganim, CNN Analysis: Some College Athletes Play Like Adults, Read Like 
5th-Graders, CNN (Jan. 8, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/us/ncaa-athletes-
reading-scores/index.html [https://perma.cc/8DNP-8HCU]. 
136.  Id.  Considering the fact that college textbooks are written at a ninth-grade level, 
this is an especially daunting situation for many of these athletes.  Id.  A very interesting fact 
about this investigation by CNN is that many universities alleged to have participated in this 
practice did not respond when they were contacted.  Id.  Such silence seems more of an 
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counterintuitive to its “purpose” of providing an education in an 
environment that includes athletics. 
Some institutions have gone even further by creating “false” classes 
or falsifying academic records so that certain athletes can remain 
academically ineligible.137  Most recently, the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) came under investigation for providing 
“paper classes” for its athletes for over a decade.138  This situation at UNC 
is not the only recent allegation of academic fraud.139  Thirty-seven cases 
of academic fraud have been reported since 1990.140  This practice seems 
to prove the point that “[c]ollege presidents . . . put in jeopardy the 
 
affirmation of guilt rather than a simple “no comment.”  Id. 
137.  Id; see e.g., Jerry Barca, Rutgers Football Turns a Bad Situation Worse, FORBES 
(Sept. 17, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jerrybarca/2015/09/17/rutgers-football-
turns-a-bad-situation-worse/ [https://perma.cc/N8LE-BJAS] (describing a very suspicious 
situation in which Rutgers head football coach contacted a teacher to discuss one player’s 
grades and eligibility just after being told that contacting faculty about grades or eligibility 
violates NCAA regulations); Paul Myerberg, Report: Auburn Paid Players, Altered Grades 
Under Gene Chizik, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:37 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/04/03/ncaa-football-auburn-violations-gene-
chizik/2051041/ [https://perma.cc/9EZS-DGNW] (reporting that several ex-players from the 
University of Auburn claim the football program changed the grades of up to nine players to 
keep them eligible for the 2010 BCS Championship game); Pete Thamel, Top Grades and No 
Class Time for Auburn Players, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/sports/ncaafootball/14auburn.html?pagewanted=all [https
://perma.cc/8G49-KK9X] (describing the “fake courses” some athletes were taking at the 
University of Auburn). 
138.  Sara Ganim, Lawsuit Claims UNC and NCAA Broke Promises in ‘Spectacular 
Fashion,’ CNN (Jan. 23, 2015, 7:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/us/unc-paper-classes-
lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/DJ3P-9SDG]; Steve Berkowitz, North Carolina, NCAA 
Sued for Academic Scandal, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2015, 9:50 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/22/lawsuit-filed-against-north-carolina-
ncaa-on-academic-scandal/22173755/ [https://perma.cc/2VJX-3DDM].  The two athletes 
bringing the suit against UNC are also claiming that the NCAA was negligent in its duties as 
an academic regulator.  Id.  The athletes claim that the NCAA “voluntarily assumed a duty to 
protect the . . . educational opportunities of student-athletes” and failed to properly execute 
that duty.  Id. 
139.  For example, Auburn University was accused of changing the grades of two of its 
athletes in 2010 so that they could participate in the 2010 BCS Championship, rather than being 
deemed “academic[ally] ineligib[le].”  Jerry Hinnen, Auburn Review Denies Allegations of 
Academic Fraud, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 22, 2013, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/22115994/auburn-review-de
nies-allegations-of-academic-fraud [https://perma.cc/2EZJ-MDYT].  
140.  Ganim, supra note 138 (showing that cases of academic fraud have doubled in the 
past decade alone). 
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academic credibility of their universities just so we can have this 
entertainment industry.”141 
However, the universities are not entirely to blame for this situation.  
In many of these situations, “[t]he athlete exploits the college by blaming 
the college for his or her lack of learning when it is the student who failed 
to respond because of limited interest.  The exploitation is mutual.”142   
If we look deeper into the story of Kevin Ross, we find that he is 
equally to blame for his lack of education.143  Creighton paid for extra 
remedial classes for Ross, transportation to those classes, and even for 
glasses to help correct an eye problem.144  He simply missed classes and 
did not try to utilize the education that Creighton was providing him.145  
Ross was basically skating through school, counting on a future career 
playing professional basketball.146 
This is an attitude that many high-profile recruits have entering 
college.147  They believe that their career will be in professional sports and 
that big-time college athletics is the stepping-stone for such a career.148  
This is instilled in them from a young age because many are recruited 
years before they even graduate from high school.149  High profile recruits 
customarily announce their commitment to their chosen university 
through a televised press conference.150  Such practices are just more 
 
141.  Ganim, supra note 135. 
142.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 299 (emphasis added). 
143.  See id. at 300–01 (discussing the Kevin Ross story from Creighton’s point of view). 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id.; Curry, supra note 131.  This was obviously an attitude that Ross had carried with 
him before he even began his college career.  A ninth-grade teacher recalls asking him once to 
use the library, to which he responded, “I don’t have to, I’m a basketball player.”  BYERS WITH 
HAMMER, supra note 3, at 300.  It should be noted that these primary and secondary school 
teachers definitely “dropped the ball” by justifying Ross’ attitude. 
147.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 298–99 (discussing Rahilly and Manley’s 
experience of putting athletic success before academic success as examples of similarly situated 
people to Ross). 
148.  See id. at 300; Mitten supra note 54, at 2.  
149.  Businesses such as Rivals.com or MaxPreps.com are centered on evaluating and 
rating the athletic potential of many young high school athletes.  MAXPREPS, 
http://www.maxpreps.com/ [https://perma.cc/W9TG-URMR] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015); 
RIVALS.COM, https://www.rivals.com/default.asp [https://perma.cc/9XK9-UBWF] (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2015). 
150.  See, e.g., Derek Volner, National Signing Day: ESPNU to Televise Marathon 
Coverage for 10th Straight Year, ESPN (Jan. 27, 2015), http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-
releases/2015/01/national-signing-day-espnu-televise-marathon-coverage-10th-straight-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/442H-72YU] (showing that this type of national coverage for recruits has 
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evidence that athletes—in particular those that are high-profile recruits—
view college as a stepping-stone to a professional career.151  They view the 
institution as a farm system for their respective sport152 while, 
simultaneously, the institution views them as athletes first and students 
second.153  And all of these facts put together show that “winning is the 
aim of [college] sports.”154  Not education.  In the future, courts should 
consider these facts as they traverse the sacrosanct ground of amateurism 
rules in antitrust law. 
B. The Rise of “Big-Time” College Athletics: The Arms Race 
When Board of Regents was decided in 1984, the college landscape 
was already beginning to change significantly.  The court already realized 
that big-time college athletics (what has now become FBS football and 
D-I men’s basketball) were more of a business than an extra-curricular 
activity.155  By that time, amateurism in the NCAA, as it had been defined 
by the association in its inception in 1906, was on its way out the door.156  
 
been going on for at least the last decade); Watch 2015 National Signing Day Announcements 
on TV or Streaming Online, SB NATION (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:39 AM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football-recruiting/2015/2/3/7948215/national-signing-day-20
15-tv-schedule-espn-espnu [https://perma.cc/N9AZ-YLK6] (describing when and where to 
watch the commitment announcements of some of the top recruits on Signing Day); Woody 
Wommack, Ten Biggest Recruiting Reveals, RIVALS.COM (Jan. 29, 2015), 
https://footballrecruiting.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=1730626 [https://perma.cc/NCE5-
D69A] (describing the ten “biggest splash” announcement ceremonies by high school seniors 
committing to play at a certain university).  Though this type of national attention is primarily 
for highly touted recruits, local networks consistently will cover press conferences where local 
high school athletes will announce their commitment to a certain university.  See, e.g., 4-star RB 
Jordan Scarlett to Announce Commitment Monday on FOXSportsFlorida.com, FOX SPORTS 
(Feb. 1, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/florida/story/jordan-scarlett-recruiting-
commitment-announcement-monday-020115 [https://perma.cc/EN93-WNTX]. 
151.  This does not suggest that this is the thought of every student-athlete that plays FBS 
football or D-I men’s basketball.  Many of them do graduate and have fruitful careers beyond 
sports.  For example, Hall-of-Fame quarterback Steve Young not only graduated but also has 
a Juris Doctorate from Brigham Young University, which he received while playing 
professional football.  Mary Waldron, The Life and Career of Steve Young: Lawyer and Football 
Player, LAW CROSSING, http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/3759/The-MVP-J-D-Steve-
Young/ [https://perma.cc/TYZ4-7HNT] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
152.  See Mitten, supra note 54, at 2. 
153.  See supra pp. 525–26 and notes 120–124. 
154.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 304. 
155.  This is evidenced by the fact that the court held that the preservation amateurism 
alone was not enough of a procompetitive justification to overcome the anticompetitive effects 
of the restraint on the marketplace.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
101–02 & n.23 (1984). 
156.  Id. at 91–95 (discussing the broadcasting plan negotiated by the NCAA and the 
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The money universities spent on big-time college athletics began to 
increase substantially in the mid-twentieth century and has now become 
an all-out arms race.157  The purpose of such an arms race: To lure top 
athletes to commit to play at their institution. 
In the early 1940s, Michigan State University wanted to step out of 
the shadow of its bigger brother (the University of Michigan) and shed its 
reputation as only an instructional school for tradesmen and farmers.158  
The medium it chose for its rise to stardom: Athletics.159  John Hannah, 
who became president of Michigan State in 1941, began to acquire large 
donations for the university.160  He put all of the new funds into athletic 
scholarships (which were unheard of at the time).161  Within ten years, 
Hannah’s crazy spending worked.  In 1949, Michigan State, much to the 
chagrin of the University of Michigan, was admitted to the Big Nine, now 
Big Ten, Conference.162 
The success of Michigan State was unprecedented.163  Hannah used 
sports as the driving influence to change the perception and prestige of 
his university.164  He decided that “if he was going to get for his institution 
equal treatment at the hands of the Michigan legislature, he would have 
to compete effectively with Michigan on the athletic field.”165  His theory 
took the university from an enrollment of 6,000 students and yearly 
budget of $4 million,166 to an enrollment of 40,000 students and a yearly 
budget of $100 million.167 
 
exorbitant amount of money in those broadcasting contracts). 
157.  See Michael Ventre, Football’s Facility Arms Race: Can You Top This?, NBC 
SPORTS (June 4, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://m.nbcsports.com/content/football%E2%80%99s-
facility-arms-race-can-you-top [https://perma.cc/V9HU-P8LT] (discussing the amount of 
money colleges spend on football facilities to gain an upper-hand in recruiting top athletes). 
158.  See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 41–42 (summarizing changes in the 
university’s stance on athletics after the arrival of John Hannah, who was determined to 
overtake the University of Michigan). 
159.  Id. at 41 (“Athletics bootstraps are the most convenient ones available in an 
academic world that has no clear-cut academic standards.”). 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 42.  
162.  Id. at 42–43. 
163.  Id. at 45. 
164.  Id. at 41. 
165.  Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
166.  Id. at 41. 
167.  Id. at 44.  Add to that the fact that the university had grown to include fifteen colleges 
and 250 academic programs.  Id. 
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This success story became the inspiration for other schools to seek 
greater notoriety, and thus higher admissions rates and more money, by 
gaining athletic rather than academic accolades.168  Thus began what is 
now affectionately called the NCAA “arms race.”169  Colleges, in order to 
increase the overall success of the academic institution, will “weigh 
heavily in favor of athletics readiness over academic preparedness.”170 
By the time Board of Regents rolled around, the television contracts 
that the NCAA was negotiating were in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars.171  And that was with its own market restraint in both price and 
output still in place.172  Once that restraint was removed, it was clear to 
see that the market demand for big-time college athletics was 
enormous.173  Consumers made it clear that the more access they had to 
these athletic events, the better.174  Colleges who could gain significant 
 
168.  Byers points to schools such as UCLA, UNLV, Florida State, and the University of 
Houston who successfully followed the Michigan State model to gain greater respect and 
prestige and ultimately more money for their institutions using success on the gridiron or 
basketball court.  Id. at 46. 
169.  Brian Goff, NCAA “Arms Race” Metaphor Gets the Economics Backwards, FORBES 
(July 30, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briangoff/2014/07/30/ncaa-arms-race-
metaphor-gets-the-economics-backwards/ [https://perma.cc/X2QE-BPFM] (“One of the most 
frequently uttered or written phrases in association with college athletics these days is ‘arms 
race.’”).  The theory of the “arms race” is simple: Because NCAA member institutions cannot 
engage in price competition in the market for collegiate athletes, they engage in non-price 
competition in the form of “strategic investments” to lure incoming talent to them.  Adam 
Hoffer et al., The NCAA Athletics Arm Race: Theory and Evidence 2 (W. Va. Univ., Coll. of 
Bus. & Econ., Working Paper No. 14-29, 2014), http://www.be.wvu.edu/phd_economics/pdf/14-
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4AF-PH4W] (“[A]ny given athletic director knows that his schools 
odds of having a winning program will go up if it spends a little more than its rivals on coaches 
and recruiting.  But the same calculus is plainly visible to all other schools.”). 
170.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 45.  This very phrase again seems 
contradictory for institutions who claim to value academic success as the priority for their 
“amateur” athletes. 
171.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 92–93 nn.9–10, 95 (1984) 
(discussing the details of the NCAA broadcasting plan that the CFA was challenging.); see also 
BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 253–71 (discussing the change in economic realities for 
NCAA broadcasting rights up to 1984). 
172.  See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 278. 
173.  See, e.g., id. at 253–71 (showing that the CFA was able to gain contracts for its 
member schools in excess of those in the NCAA plan, and years later that the SEC could gain 
contracts in excess of even those). 
174.  This is still the case today.  It is hard to find a Saturday during the school year where 
you are unable to find a college football or basketball game on some broadcasting network.  
Each weekend has wall-to-wall college sports.  ESPN kicks off the men’s basketball season with 
“Midnight Madness,” in which it airs the first college basketball games of the season for 24-
straight hours, with many universities participating.  Derek Volner, ESPN Tips Off the College 
Basketball Season with Midnight Madness Coverage, ESPN (Sept. 29, 2014), 
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prime-time television slots started to put that in their arsenal to lure talent 
to their athletic programs.175  And that is only how television broadcasting 
has affected the arms race. 
Throughout the NCAA, colleges are increasing their spending in their 
athletic department at exorbitant rates to engage in non-price 
competition for the purpose of attracting the top athletic talents to play 
for their institution.176  In this market, if you do not have the right coach 
or staff, the right facility, or top-of-the-line equipment, you might just slip 
out of contention.177  Such a drop is especially costly when you consider 
the fact that winning games “increases alumni athletic donations, 
enhances a school’s academic reputation, increases the number of 
applicants and in-state students, reduces acceptance rates, and raises 
average incoming SAT scores.”178  In the minds of these schools and 
athletic departments, it’s either “we pay and at the least stay as relevant 
as our rivals” or “we do not and our rivals begin to outpace us in 
successfully luring top talent.” 
There are many examples of how schools are steadily increasing their 
expenses to better their athletic programs so that they can bring the best 
athletes to their school.179  However, the best example of the arms race is 
 
http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases/2014/09/espn-tips-off-the-college-basketball-seas
on-with-midnight-madness-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/BE2J-5HD2].  With the advent of the 
internet, television is no longer the only way you can view college games.  Many games that are 
not broadcast on television can be streamed online.  The point is that the consumer demand 
for these big-time college athletics has reached astronomical levels. 
175.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 279 (discussing how television appearances 
helped bolster recruiting effectiveness of weaker teams). 
176.  Michael L. Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic Success: An Application of the 
Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18196, 2015), http://are.berkeley.edu/~mlanderson/pdf/Anderson%20Coll
ege%20Sports.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7EK-YJMM]. 
177.  Ventre, supra note 157 (quoting a high-profile coach as saying, “It does help in 
recruiting . . . .  It helped with last year’s class, just them knowing . . . that they’d be in that 
building.  It does have an impact on recruiting.”). 
178.  Anderson, supra note 176, at 24 (noting that an increase in wins by three games could 
lead to an increase in donations of 17%, an increase in applications of 3%, a drop in acceptance 
rate of 1.3%, an increase of in-state enrollment of 1.8%, and a 2.4 point increase of incoming 
25th percentile SAT scores (0.2%)). 
179.  It is not forgotten than NCAA institutions are not-for-profit.  Goff, supra note 169.  
That is, what they receive in revenue they also spend.  But the increased athletic revenue 
creates many benefits for the institution as a whole, even if expenses from that revenue mainly 
stay within the athletic department.  USA Today Sports’ College Athletics Finances, USA 
TODAY (May 16, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-
college-athletics-finances-database/54955804/1 [https://perma.cc/8DEU-JFLK] (showing the 
revenues for athletic departments from 2006–2011).  Discussing this increase in spending is 
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the huge increase in coaching compensation that has occurred over the 
last few decades.180  In both football and men’s basketball, the highest 
paid coaches earn over $7 million.181  This is in stark contrast to John 
Wooden’s salary of $32,500 in 1975.182  This is a testimony of how far the 
business of big-time college athletics has come in the last forty years.  This 
is a salary increase of about 21,500% for top coaches in just four decades.  
The average FBS football coach made $1.75 million in 2014.183  There are 
even assistant coaches who make over $1 million in FBS football.184  When 
we look at player compensation, however, we find that their “earnings” 
have not increased significantly since 1956185—tuition, books, room and 
board, and incidentals.186   
During this economic revolution, it again became apparent that 
“winning is the aim of [college] sports.”187  In the early stages of Board of 
 
meant to add to the evidence that schools are keeping for themselves what should be given, at 
least in part, to the athletes who, also in part, earn it for their schools and that to withhold it is 
an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
180.  See NCAA Salaries: 2015 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY, 
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ [https://perma.cc/9GPQ-QVXJ] (last visited Oct. 22, 
2015) (listing the salaries for FBS football coaches in 2014). 
181.  Id. (listing Nick Saban’s 2015 salary at $7,087,481); An Analysis of Salaries for 
College Basketball Coaches, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011, 4:41 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2011-coaches-salary-database.
htm [https://perma.cc/6922-9U2T] (listing Rick Pitino’s 2011 salary at $8,931,378.).  
Unfortunately, the most recent numbers in men’s basketball coaching salaries I could find were 
those from the 2011 season.  Id. 
182.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 9.  John Wooden is widely considered one 
of the greatest basketball coaches of all time.  Wooden Dies at Age 99, ESPN (June 6, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/losangeles/news/story?id=5253601 [https://perma.cc/3MS8-FL28].  
He built a dynasty at UCLA that included ten National Championships, four 30–0 records, and 
an 88-game winning streak.  Frank Litsky and John Branch, John Wooden, Who Built 
Incomparable Dynasty at U.C.L.A., Dies at 99, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/sports/ncaabasketball/05wooden.html?_r=0 [https://perm
a.cc/Y9HL-SD4X].  Wooden retired after the 1975 season, making the salary quoted above the 
salary he received during his final year as a coach.  Id. 
183.  Jim Baumbach, Special Report: College Football Coaches’ Salaries and Perks Are 
Soaring, NEWSDAY (Oct. 4, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/college/college-
football/fbs-college-football-coaches-salaries-are-perks-are-soaring-newsday-special-report-1.
9461669 [https://perma.cc/3V2E-YSQR]. 
184.  NCAA Salaries: 2014 NCAAF Assistant Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY, 
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/football/assistant [https://perma.cc/LUK4-5ZQE] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (showing that the top five assistant coaches in FBS are paid over $1 
million). 
185.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 10.  That is until the O’Bannon decision was 
handed down last year. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. at 304. 
 2015] THE AMATEURISM JUSTIFICATION 535 
Regents, the presidents of two major universities testified that “amateur 
collegiate sports were dead.”188  This arms race is just another fact 
showing how that true amateur in college athletics is a bygone notion.  
This is an $11 billion industry.189  The fact that revenue and expenses—
especially in coaches salary—have increased so significantly while player 
compensation has not is a rather condemning fact, considering the fact 
that, in reality, the NCAA institutions no longer truly consider their 
players as amateurs.190 
On the one hand, this arms race is important to athletes because 
having top-of-the-line equipment and training helps further their goal of 
eventually reaching the level of the National Football League (NFL) or 
National Basketball Association (NBA).  However, it is unfortunate that 
the there is no real competition for their talents as there would be in an 
unrestrained market.  These facts of an apparent arms race in big-time 
college athletics show that there is a very real market for compensating 
players which is currently being met through non-price competition 
rather than actual compensation.  This factual inquiry again shows that 
courts should continue to follow the lead of O’Bannon by refusing to 
allow the NCAA to unreasonably restrain the market for player 
compensation. 
C. The BCS, CFP, and Power Five Autonomy 
Another justification that the NCAA gives for its amateurism rules is 
that it promotes competitive balance among its member institutions.191  
The courts have, until O’Bannon, found that such restrictions are 
“directly related to the NCAA objective[] of . . . promoting fair 
competition.”192  In Hennessey v. NCAA,193 the court held that 
Bylaw [12.1] was, with other rules adopted at the same time, 
intended to be an “economy measure”.  In this sense it was both 
in design and effect one having commercial impact.  But the 
fundamental objective in mind was to preserve and foster 
competition in intercollegiate athletics—by curtailing, as it were, 
 
188.  Id. at 8. 
189.  Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the 
NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 61, 61 
(2013) (noting that college sports as an $11 billion industry). 
190.  See id. at 68; supra p. 526. 
191.  See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
192.  Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
193.  564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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potentially monopolistic practices by the more powerful—and to 
reorient the programs into their traditional role as amateur sports 
operating as part of the educational process.194 
This justification is no longer relevant in today’s big-time college 
market because the “more powerful” have gained most of the control 
throughout both FBS football and men’s basketball.195 
In 1998, FBS football saw the advent of the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS).196  This organization was a coalition of the six major football 
conferences in the NCAA—the ACC, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-10, 
and SEC, along with the University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame).197  In 
the original agreement, it was decided that four of the biggest bowl games 
(Rose, Sugar, Orange, and Fiesta) would be played by members of these 
six conferences and Notre Dame.198  The six conference winners would 
automatically qualify, as would Notre Dame if it finished in the top 10 in 
the BCS standings.199  These Automatic Qualifying (AQ) conferences 
dominated the BCS landscape for years.200  Because of this, these six 
conferences also dominated in bowl revenue since the BCS bowls were 
the highest paying by far.201  And because of the prestige associated with 
these games, the highest television revenue also went to these 
conferences.202 
 
194.  Id. at 1153 (emphasis added). 
195.  See Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2014, 
1:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-
autonomy-five-power-conferences [https://perma.cc/X2FV-XCN6]. 
196.  The Bowl Championship Series: A Golden Era, BCS (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=10172026 [https://perma.cc/ES83-6Z2V]. 
197.  BCS Chronology, BCS (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:39 PM), 
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819366 [https://perma.cc/P4YH-WJQU]. 
198.  Id.  Other schools were also allowed to qualify for one of the four games if they 
finished the season in the top six in the BCS standings.  Id. 
199.  Id. 
200.  See BCS Selections History, BCS (Oct. 7, 2013, 8:00 PM) 
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=5528971 [https://perma.cc/Y3EW-8VTU]. 
201.  See, e.g., Thomas O’Toole, $17M BCS Payouts Sound Great, But . . . – League, Bowl 
Rules Skew Schools’ Cuts, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2006, at 1C (listing the bowl payouts for each 
bowl game of the 2006 season); David Wharton, Big-Time Bowl Games Can Create Big-Time 
Financial Issues for Some Schools, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/sports/la-sp-1231-bcs-payouts-20121231 [https://perma.
cc/6BLW-724G] (explaining that the six AQ conferences receive $25 million each, plus another 
$6 million for any additional at-large bid). 
202.  Wharton, supra note 201. 
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This absolutely created an enormous gap between those teams 
considered part of the AQ conferences and those outside of them.203  
During the tenure of the BCS, only eight teams outside of the AQ 
conferences were selected to play in a BCS game204 (none until the 
University of Utah in 2005205), and not one of them played for the BCS 
National Championship.206  Amateurism rules did not stop these AQ 
conferences from seizing the power in major college football through the 
BCS.207 
This past year, the BCS was replaced with the College Football 
Playoff.208  In this new format, the “Power Five” (the six AQ conferences 
from the BCS except the Big East since it no longer is a football 
conference) still hold most of the power and prestige.209  Amateurism 
rules have not kept the Power Five from keeping power, even in a playoff 
system. 
On August 7, 2014, the NCAA board of directors voted to allow these 
Power Five conferences to write some of their own rules.210  This 
allowance of autonomy for the “five richest leagues” is absolutely in 
contradiction of the NCAA’s own argument that its amateurism rules are 
 
203.  Id. (discussing the fact that non-AQ teams do not get the same payout as AQ teams 
even if they were selected for a BCS game). 
204.  The Bowl Championship Series: A Golden Era, supra note 196. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Since Brigham Young University (BYU) is the only university to win a National 
Championship outside of those conferences in the modern era (since 1936), it can be argued 
that the gap began long before the formation of the BCS.  See Football Championship History, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/history/football/fbs [https://perma.cc/62CE-HVB2] (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2015). 
208.  See Tony Barnhart, Before BCS Ends, the Whens, Wheres, Whys of College Football 
Playoff, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:01 AM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/tony-barnhart/24400200/before-bcs-ends-the-
whens-wheres-and-whys-of-college-football-playoff [https://perma.cc/6TXA-9WZA]; College 
Football Playoff: Overview, CFP, http://www.collegefootballplayoff.com/overview 
[https://perma.cc/T5D8-CNVJ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
209.  See George Schroeder, Power Five’s College Football Playoff Revenues Will Double 
What BCS Paid, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/07/16/college-football-playoff-financial-reve
nues-money-distribution-bill-hancock/12734897/ [https://perma.cc/QL9R-S5WL] (showing 
that the financial distributions still heavily favor those conferences that have come to dominate 
the landscape of FBS football). 
210.  Bennett, supra note 195.  This will allow them to decide on rules such as cost-of-
attendance stipends, insurance benefits for players, staff sizes, recruiting rules, and mandatory 
hours on individual sports.  Id. 
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meant to curtail.211  What is even more curious is that the vote for Power 
Five autonomy was overwhelming.212 
This history is just a small example of how these amateurism rules do 
not serve their purpose in today’s market for big-time college athletics.  
The procompetitive effect that it was supposed to have on the product—
competitive balance—was all but lost once the NCAA decided that the 
Power Five had obtained an irreversible advantage over those not a part 
of that elite group. 
D. Lack of Any Other Procompetitive Evidence in Favor of Amateurism 
As stated above, a procompetitive justification for a challenged 
restraint must “actually enhance competition.”213  “[T]he Rule [of Reason] 
does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a 
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason.”214  
Throughout this factual inquiry, we have seen that there is no actual 
procompetitive economic justification for these amateurism rules. 
However, the court in O’Bannon did recognize a survey as evidence 
that there is a procompetitive economic effect of these rules.215  The court 
found that the survey by Dr. Dennis did provide evidence “that the 
public’s attitudes toward student-athlete compensation depend heavily 
on the level of compensation.”216  This is strange since earlier in the 
opinion the court found that the survey “[did] not provide credible 
evidence that demand for the NCAA’s product would decrease if student-
athletes were permitted . . . to receive a limited share of the 
revenue . . . .”217 
The court, however, erred in finding that this provided enough 
evidence that such a rule prohibiting compensation enhances 
 
211.  Id.; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
212.  Bennett, supra note 195 (noting that the vote was 16–2 in favor of autonomy). 
213.  Nagy, supra note 44, at 336. 
214.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688–90 (1978) (“[B]y 
indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or non-expediency of having made the 
contracts, or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made.” 
(quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911)). 
215.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000–01.   
216.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination that this proved a 
procompetitive economic effect.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
217.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 976 (discussing the reasons for why the court does not 
believe that the survey was credible evidence). 
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competition.218  First, as already discussed, the court had previously 
discredited the evidence.219  Second, this provides no definitive proof that 
the consumer’s behavior would change if players were to be compensated 
above their current scholarships.  Exorbitant player salaries in 
professional leagues have not deterred consumption of their product.220  
Nor has the addition of professional players into the Olympics.221  And, 
 
218.  Id. at 996–97.  This argument differs from the Ninth Circuit argument that there was 
insufficient evidence that the cash compensation represented a less restrictive alternative.  
Here, I am arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove a procompetitive economic effect 
of the rule on the marketplace or consumer demand. 
219.  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 976.  If the court did want credible evidence, it could 
possibly look to a poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC News.  See Alex Prewitt, 
Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington Post-ABC News Poll Finds, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/large-majority-
opposes-paying-ncaa-athletes-washington-post-abc-news-poll-finds/2014/03/22/c411a32e-b13
0-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a48b_story.html [https://perma.cc/9JTN-EUCT].  This poll found that 
64% of the public opposes compensation of student-athletes beyond current scholarships.  Id.  
However, what this poll does not suggest is that the consumer would actually change his or her 
behavior if players were compensated for their play on the field.  Such evidence would be 
necessary for the NCAA to prove that its restrictions actually enhance competition.  It would 
also behoove future opponents to the NCAA to include a poll such as that conducted by 
YouGov and the Huffington Post.  Travis Waldron, Most College Sports Fans Won’t Stop 
Watching If Athletes Are Paid, Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/college-sports-pay-players-poll_5630e7dbe4b00aa54a4c
0b43 [https://perma.cc/685E-ZKCH].  This poll shows that only 16% of the market would be 
less interested in college sports if they were given $5,000 compensation for their names, images, 
and likenesses.  Id.  Of that 16%, only 41% of them would stop watching altogether.  Id.  That 
equates to about 7% of those that said they watch college sports occasionally.  Id.  Such 
evidence would be vital for opponents of the NCAA in proving that removal of these 
amateurism restrictions would not significantly change market demand.  
220.  See Average NFL Player, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_06/b4214058615722.htm [https://perma.c
c/7LQK-KX4F]; Average N.F.L. Salary is $90,102, Survey Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1982, at 
A22, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/29/sports/average-nfl-salary-is-90102-survey-says.html
?pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/7KF8-RP4T]; Daniel Kaplan, NFL Projecting Revenue 
Increase of $1B over 2014, SPORTS BUS. J. (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/03/09/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodie
s/NFL-revenue.aspx [https://perma.cc/D66Z-GDE7]; NBA Player Salaries - 1999–2000, ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/nba/salaries [https://perma.cc/XT4Q-AZ2B] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015); 
Stern Estimates NBA Revenue Up 20 Percent to $5B, NBA (Nov. 13, 2012, 6:48 PM), 
http://www.nba.com/2012/news/11/13/stern-nba-revenue.ap/ [https://perma.cc/K5FP-ERG6]; 
The NESN Staff, Some Athletes Were Legendary, but Their Salaries Weren’t, NESN (May 23, 
2010, 9:51 AM), http://nesn.com/2010/05/sports-legends-salaries-may-surprise-you/ 
[https://perma.cc/RS4Y-KYDM]. 
221  See Neil Best, NBC Releases Winter Olympics Ratings Data, NEWSDAY (Feb. 25, 
2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/olympics/nbc-releases-sochi-winter-olympics-
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considering revenue for college sports is still much lower than those 
professional teams receive, any compensation for players would not be 
anywhere near the professional level if athletes were allowed to be 
compensated in college.  There is no evidence supporting the assertion 
that the market will not balance itself out. 
Unless better evidence is released, the NCAA amateurism rules 
should be found in violation of the Sherman Act because they do not 
provide a procompetitive justification that they enhance competition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In 1985, Walter Byers urged the NCAA to allow for player 
compensation outside of the current athletic scholarships.222  The NCAA 
has not heeded his call since it was made nearly thirty years ago.  The 
NCAA has enjoyed exemption from antitrust law since courts decided to 
follow the dicta of Board of Regents rather than its ruling.  O’Bannon has 
finally put us back on the right track in making the NCAA responsible 
for its unreasonable restraint of trade in the market for player 
compensation.  This ruling should remind the courts that they must do a 
full factual inquiry when it comes to the NCAA’s amateurism rules.  For 
preservation of amateurism alone is not enough to prove that these rules 
enhance competition.223  It is time that “[f]ree-market competition [is] 
restored to this industry.”224 
MICHAEL STEELE 
 
ratings-data-1.7204742 [https://perma.cc/HT5B-YECA] (stating that viewership for the 2014 
Winter Olympics was up 6% from the previous European Olympics in 2006). 
222.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 13. 
223.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 (1984). 
224.  BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 3, at 293. 
